This landmark era, notable especially for the ending of legal inequities regarding the composition of Clemson’s student body, represented the ushering in of a new, more “modern” Clemson, shown here with a key driver of that movement, President R. C. Edwards, ca. 1965. Clemson University Photographs, CUL.SC.
CHAPTER XVII

Crucible,

End of Legal Inequities

1955–1964

Regardless of how well Clemson’s reorganization was progressing, or the ending of Clemson’s military discipline was being accepted, or the way women were being received in the Clemson student body, the international and national developments on race, civil rights, and equity certainly indicated that some South Carolina public institutions or services would have to decide how to proceed. The surprise was not that the question of civil rights arose, but where and how it arose. Most challenges to racial segregation that attracted great attention came in public issues—education, employment, and accommodations. For Clemson, the challenge arose in research.

When it came to research, Clemson trustees had been of two minds. They had been very supportive of agricultural research, but they were very hesitant about major commitments to fields in which they could not see return value for South Carolina.

Thus, the utility of urging active work in forest industries made immediate sense to the trustees. Their inability to get legislative attention to focus on forests in the 1920s and 1930s may have been the long-term investment necessary for the legislature to see income benefits in forest research. By the same token, in a state without much in the way of mineral deposits, the trustees had little interest in the fields of automotive or aeronautic research, despite faculty and student interest in such areas, nor in the strides young Clemson alumni made in those fields in the same two inter-war decades (1919–1940).

The Second World War had become, among many other things, a race for sources of power and for increased firepower. In the 1930s, 1940s, and into the early 1950s, the search for exploitable and renewable resources had focused on the ability to find oil and gold deposits. Now the new power source was atomic or nuclear energy. While the European conflict had been brought to an end by slowly amassed and armed traditional weaponry, a major factor in the end of the Asian war was the unleashing of nuclear might. Although it raised the terrifying specter of human annihilation, nuclear energy held out a glittering promise of a utopia in any industry that required any form of animal or mineral power.
Nuclear Energy

Shortly after Bob Edwards was appointed vice president for development, an opportunity for the college in the arena of nuclear energy presented itself. On September 5, 1956, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) announced that it would grant to a small number of accredited universities and colleges equipment, advanced faculty training, and (later) money to offer graduate education in nuclear science and technology. With personal visits, phone calls, and letters, Edwards urged the trustees to seize this chance immediately. Clemson, he pointed out, could be very attractive for developing a program in the field. It was reasonably close to two centers of atomic research at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Alabama. The emerging power and water availability in the planned Savannah River plant added to its appeal, and the large amount of underdeveloped land that Clemson held in the Savannah Valley was a special component. In October 1956, the trustees voted to pursue the possibility of work in such a field.1

James Sams, engineering dean (and, ironically, the man who years earlier had urged Clemson’s entry into automotive and aeronautic engineering), gathered a team of men in physics, mathematics, and engineering to consider the AEC request for proposals; to recommend to him, Hunter, Kinard, and Williams whether or not to enter the fray; and, if so, to suggest what researchers should be added to the team to write the proposal. A positive recommendation came quickly, and the expanded committee formed, comprised mainly of faculty who had spent time working at one of the U.S. nuclear facilities.

By December 4, 1956, Sams had gained institutional approval, and Clemson submitted a request for $99,050 to the AEC for establishing a research program in nuclear energy. Within five months, the AEC had granted Clemson’s request. Ultimately, the $99,050 could have been used to garner about $350,000 worth of valuable laboratory equipment. Edwards also forecast the need to send some faculty and staff for extensive (perhaps two years) training at AEC installations. Then the big expense would come. A critical reactor large enough to meet all the teaching and research activities cost about $1.5 million. Edwards had already arranged a meeting with USC President Donald Russell to discuss full cooperation and to avoid duplication.2

Edwards then sent the AEC documents to William L. Watkins, Clemson’s lawyer, for review. Watkins wrote back on May 20, 1957, noting a possible conflict between the AEC contract and a one-year-old provision in the S.C. Appropriations Act of 1956. The AEC contract required nonracial discrimination in admission of qualified persons to have access to, or use of, the facility. Watkins reminded Edwards that the Appropriations Act made the use of state-appropriated money dependent on racial segregation in state facilities. However, the restriction applied only to “collegiate” activities (thus avoiding extension work), and the act used the word “pupil”
in connection with admissions, limiting the action to students admitted to Clemson. Watkins warned that he would have to research the issue further, but he thought the possible state restrictions could be overcome. Nonetheless, he recommended getting the advice of the general assembly’s Special Segregation Committee, and that Clemson pay attention to what Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi were doing.³

Edwards and Watkins met first with S.C. Governor George Bell Timmerman Jr., who recommended that Clemson not sign the AEC contract. They also met with Senator Marion Gressette, chair of the Special Segregation Committee, who concurred with the governor, although he seemed reluctant to involve himself or the committee in the work of the trustees. With advice from Cooper and Daniel, Edwards asked Watkins to redraft the wording in the AEC contract of Condition 8, which gave Timmerman and Gressette pause. The original statement read: “(8) The recipient agrees that no person shall be barred from participation in the educational and training program involved or be the subject of unfavorable discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or religion.”

Clemson offered the following revision: “(8) The grantee agrees that no legally enrolled student or member of its faculty and staff shall be barred from participation in the educational and training program involved or be the subject of unfavorable discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, or religion.”⁴ Before Clemson mailed the suggestion, Watkins contacted an unidentified South Carolinian on the staff of the AEC who suggested such a modification might be accepted.

As Edwards prepared for the June 1957 Clemson board meeting, Watkins wrote Timmerman, explaining the recent developments. Further, he reminded the governor that Clemson, relying on the federal telegram, had ordered the equipment requested. A delay would set Clemson back a crucial year and further handicap

William L. Watkins (1910–1999), a native of Anderson and a product of Wofford and the University of Virginia’s School of Law, practiced law with the Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Gable, and Gray firm in Anderson. He served as Clemson’s counsel from the 1940s to 1960s, representing the college’s interests in cases concerning Hartwell Lake, integration, the university status change, and the issue of outside access to the campus. Watkins (far right) is pictured with (left to right) S.C. Attorney General Daniel R. McLeod, Assistant Attorney General William L. Pope, and Clemson President R. C. Edwards. Taken from Greenville News, August 23, 1962, edition.
South Carolina’s quest to attract new industry. Watkins called attention to Timmerman’s statement, basically affirmed by the Gressette committee, that “if Federal money should not be available except at the cost of sacrificing the great principles involved…state funds should be made available.” Watkins added, “We wonder if you will express to the Free Conference Committee a request that the amount of the grant be made available to the College if the AEC does not modify the condition of the grant.”

On June 11, 1957, William Mitchell, the AEC general counsel, responded. Mitchell pointed out that Clemson’s stated reason for requesting the rewording was to ensure that the institution did not lose control of its prerogatives to select its students and faculty and to discipline them as the school considers appropriate. Mitchell dismissed that argument, stating bluntly that the federal language was to guarantee equal access to all such facilities and instruction if they were members of the group selected for participation in the program. It was “to prohibit discrimination because of race, creed, color, or religion among the student body.” The counsel ended his letter, requesting that Clemson accept the contract as had thirty-three other schools.

Edwards placed all the information before the Board of Trustees at its June meeting. Apparently, the trustees discussed the entire issue at great length, but that can only be inferred. By a split vote, the board instructed the administration to sign the agreement, which was the first clear indication that a number of trustees were not rigid segregationists. Edwards executed the document and returned it to Washington on June 22, 1957. Watkins informed the governor and Senator Gressette on June 25.

Governor Timmerman was away at a governors’ conference when Watkins’s letter arrived. When he read it, he was not happy. He replied to Watkins stating,

It is with grave concern that I learn from your letter that, on the day following sine die adjournment of the General Assembly, the Board of the Trustees of Clemson College voted to accept a grant of $99,000.00 from the Atomic Energy Commission upon the terms of condition (8). This action is contrary to the advice which you previously had sought from the Gressette Committee and from me as Governor.

He set forth three objections (in no stated priority). On the issue of “race,” he rejected Watkins’s and Edwards’s argument that in this context it did not apply to admissions. Second, he interpreted “creed” to open entrance to Clemson for persons with political “creeds” such as communism. Third, he objected to a state institution accepting financial aid from the federal government while the state was perfectly able to provide the support. The governor closed by asking the Clemson board to rescind its action of June 21. The Governor’s Office sent a copy of the letter to every board member.

The trustees’ reactions varied. One indicated that he could see the governor’s concern and would ask Board President Cooper to reopen the question. Several thought the governor overreacted and that a trustees’ committee should meet with
the governor to convince him of such. No one commented on the issue of “creed.” Further, the governor seems to have done nothing to address the request that the state move to supply Clemson the funds it would forego by turning down the federal grant. Senator Gressette’s reply of July 6, 1957, was even stronger. He added an implied threat:

But I am not convinced that we should not consider legislation at the next session of the General Assembly whereby no governing body of an institution shall be permitted to enter into an agreement with the Federal Government or any of its sub-divisions until such time as the subject agreement has been approved by some legally constituted agency of the State for that purpose.

Although this represented an unusual statement, the direction of his thought was there. Gressette addressed the letter to Watkins, but he also copied it to Timmerman, R. M. Jeff eries, each Clemson trustee, and R. C. Edwards. No records show it sent to President Poole.

Timmerman’s letter drew a number of replies. On behalf of the board, Watkins wrote the governor on July 2, 1957, acknowledging receipt of the governor’s letter and telling him that the board had not met to take action on his request. Watkins noted that the date for the meeting of the board had been set “almost three months ago,” and with no relation to the general assembly’s sine die adjournment.

Watkins’s subsequent letter to the board raised two relevant questions about Timmerman’s communication. First, he noted that the federal offer could not be considered a violation of states’ rights because the federal government had a monopoly on fissionable materials and products. He wrote, “It is no more possible to conduct a nuclear science course at the College without signing a contract with the Commission than it is to conduct an ROTC program without signing a contract with the Army or the Navy.” And Watkins also pointed to his letter of June 4 to the governor, asking for funding for the program as the governor and Gressette had both suggested Clemson do. The governor had not replied.9

Byrnes had misgivings about the entire application. Cooper, who had a close relationship with Byrnes, wrote him after the exchanges and attempted to ease his concerns by pointing out that in conversations with Mitchell, AEC’s general counsel, Cooper had received assurance that the use restriction to Clemson students and faculty was satisfactory to Mitchell and was close to the same limitations that the Department of Agriculture used with the Cooperative Extension Service. Nonetheless, Cooper told Byrnes that Clemson would “comply with the governor’s request.”10

**Interracial Developments**

But this did not deter Edwards from his long-range plan to enhance Clemson’s research posture in all parts of the college. A plan that Edwards and Sams had de-
veloped to reopen the never-well-funded Engineering Experiment Station had been built on the premise that Clemson was to receive the AEC grant in 1957; it came to naught because of the governor’s objection. But governors change, and the election brought to the state Governor’s Office Ernest Hollings, a man determined, as were Cooper, Daniel, Edwards, and younger public leaders, to improve South Carolina economically. It would be hard to label them as “liberals” on a national scale, but in the minds of many white southerners, they seemed so. These men, like most of the Clemson faculty, had lived through the Depression and had served in World War II. Nor were their thoughts far out of step with moderate southern white leadership. James Coleman, governor of Mississippi (1956–1960), had expressed this well in his statement, “I believe in preserving segregation, but I don’t believe in waging war. In the first place, I am a loyal American, and in the second place, you can’t win.” Earlier, he remarked, “Mississippi will be a state of law not of violence.”

While this position might not satisfy all modern critics, it was the gradualism whose roots lay in the utterances of Abraham Lincoln, the practical progressivist notions of Walter Merritt Riggs, the strategies of Franklin Roosevelt, and many who combined morality with practicality. But the crucial question was, “When was the time?” For long-suffering African Americans, and representative groups such as the NAACP, the answer was, “Now,” as it was for American liberals of other races. But a reaction to gradualism began erupting shortly after World War I. The signs of “resistance to change” materialized in many ways. In some quarters, it appeared in personal actions, such as those of “Cotton” Ed Smith, South Carolina’s senior senator who stormed out of the 1936 Democratic national convention when an African American minister came to the podium to deliver the invocation. Some of the South Carolina delegation followed Smith. Byrnes and the other South Carolina progressives stayed in the convention hall.

But by 1948, the opposition to racial integration hardened, and again the focus fell on South Carolina. Once more, the setting was Philadelphia and the occasion the Democratic Party convention. This time the issue was not a prayer, but a platform plank in which the platform committee proposed the use of all federal power to end segregation, both de facto and de jure, everywhere in the United States. On the vote on the plank, the convention chairman Sam Rayburn of Texas, perhaps concerned that the debate had been more fierce and even more widespread than anticipated, called for a voice vote. He ruled that the affirmative had won and the “civil rights platform” was adopted. There were immediate demands for “Division” and “Roll Call.” Rayburn ignored the calls and moved the convention agenda forward. Some southern states’ delegations left the hall. A political revolt was in the making.

The immediate upshot resulted in the formation of one more “third party,” the States’ Rights Party, called by most the “Dixiecrats.” Its Birmingham convention nominated Strom Thurmond, then South Carolina’s governor (and a Clem-
son alumnus), for president, and Mississippi’s Governor Fielding Wright for vice president. They attempted to focus the issue on the concept that the federal government had consistently violated the U.S. Constitution by ignoring the Tenth Amendment (the “reservation of power” or “states’ rights” amendment). Whatever their spoken positions may have been, much of the national conversation focused on continued segregation, and while support (even tacit) was greater than the popular vote indicated, it did not appear as one of the major political issues for most white Americans. The States’ Rights ticket gained only 2.41 percent of the popular national support confined to the southern states. People also cast a negligible number of votes for the ticket in Missouri, California, and North Dakota. Thurmond and Wright received a total of thirty-nine electoral votes. President Harry S. Truman received 57.1 percent of the Electoral College and won 49.55 percent of the popular vote.\footnote{13}

Antigovernment sentiment (if there was much) showed up in the South and in a few other places. National magazines noted the surprising outcropping of Confederate symbols such as the Confederate battle and naval flags (frequently erroneously called the “stars and bars”); the playing of “Dixie” by southern college and school bands also became commonplace. Clemson was not immune. One of the student clubs gave the cheerleaders a Confederate battle flag, which became an object for stealing by students from other schools. But this was neither the first nor the last time the battle flag presented a problem for Clemson students.

In the 1948 presidential election, 71.97 percent of South Carolina voters cast their ballots for the States’ Rights ticket. Among the voters who did not, a portion was a large majority of African Americans able to vote. But there were some liberals and moderates, Democratic and Republican, who formed the basis of the new progressives. They held differing views on many points, but they knew that the transformation of South Carolina lay in education, which held the key to economic and social improvement. South Carolina remained an educational backwater. Its work force was in large part unskilled, while the efforts to upgrade the quality of the public school teaching facilities begun by Governor Byrnes were just beginning to work. The improvement of the ability and value of the teaching force depended on an improved teacher pay scale. To make matters worse, many of the schools, particularly above the primary grades, had neither been designed nor fitted for much vocational education beyond agriculture. To improve lives required will and money. But South Carolina, well blessed with resolve, never had hard money in abundance.

**Public Education**

One of the earliest states to create a public institution of higher education, South Carolina founded its first state college in 1801. Earlier states that had
founded colleges included North Carolina (University of North Carolina) and Georgia (University of Georgia). In each case, the governing boards contained many churchmen from the denominations that required a “learned clergy,” a group that represented a large portion of the highly educated males in the state.

As early as 1811, the S.C. General Assembly had passed a free school act based (roughly) on population. The schools were opened only to white children, received very poor funding, and carried the stigma of being known as “paupers’ schools.” While the evidence of basic literacy and the skills of addition and subtraction indicate a higher rate of attendance, by 1860 about half the whites had some formal education. African Americans had none. The state constitution provision of any education was the result of the Republican reconstruction government, but because the requirements were neither mandatory nor segregated, most white families shunned the schools. Further, to a great extent because of the agricultural base of the economy, school terms fit around local agricultural needs. Thus, school session periods varied.

With the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes as U.S. president and the end of Reconstruction (1877), those schools not already segregated quickly did so. South Carolina’s government, faced with large debts, was fiscally conservative. And in keeping with a strong attitude of “individual responsibility,” the leadership understood education to be the responsibility of the child’s parents. By 1880, white literacy (at the most basic level) reached nearly 75 percent, while among African Americans literacy was 22 percent.

The Constitution of 1895, whose writing was dominated by Tillmanites, did not close the public school system. But the law imposed a segregated system of education, making “de jure” that which was “de facto.” It did not, as might have been anticipated, close South Carolina College, the name of the University of South Carolina at the time. And it separated the South Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical Institute (established by the general assembly in 1872), then a state institute attached to Claflin University, which was built by the Methodist Episcopal Church (North), and raised the institute in status to the Colored Normal, Industrial, Agricultural and Mechanical College of South Carolina. But the school could not grant degrees.

Only in 1907 did the S.C. General Assembly provide state revenues for high schools. Twelve years later (1919), the state enacted its first compulsory school attendance law, requiring eight- to fourteen-year-olds to attend school four months a year. But the law was not well enforced. By 1927, 279 high schools for white students and ten for black students existed. After World War II, some progress was made to boost the “equal” part within the “separate but equal” concept, spelled out in the U.S. Supreme Court 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling, which had been foreshadowed in the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890.
South Carolina Higher Education

Further, South Carolina had not developed regional schools, normal schools, vocational schools, or two-year colleges as had many other southern states, such as Mississippi, Georgia, and North Carolina. Students who excelled in vocational studies had few options. After World War II, for example, the lack of opportunity for higher education in Horry County led local citizens to form the Coastal Educational Foundation. Rather than attempting to create a new school requiring a large investment in land and buildings and having to face immediately the question of SACS accreditation, the foundation received support from the extension division of the College of Charleston as a junior college extension. It opened on September 20, 1954. Two years later, citizens in the Florence area began a similar process. Their affiliation with the University of South Carolina led to the opening of the first USC regional campus in 1957. The success of that venture prompted USC to open regional campuses in Aiken and Beaufort. When the College of Charleston closed its extension office, the Coastal Carolina Junior College lost its accredited “parent” institution, so its officers sought a tie with Clemson. But because Edwards had just begun his presidency and faced the issues of that transition, Clemson did not respond positively. Led by President Donald Russell, USC accepted the overture and added the Horry venture to its growing “system.”

Ernest Frederick “Fritz” Hollings (1922–), lieutenant governor of South Carolina from 1955 to 1959 and the 106th governor of the state from 1959 to 1963. During the waning days of his governorship, Hollings, a dedicated advocate of public education improvements in South Carolina, helped to ensure that Harvey Gantt’s entrance, and therefore Clemson’s integration, would be peaceful. He later served as a U.S. senator for his home state from 1966 to 2005, the eighth-longest serving senator in U.S. history. Clemson University Photographs, CUL.SC.

However, these schools did not offer the much-needed “shorter term” vocational education. Governor Ernest F. “Fritz” Hollings, already a recognized advocate of improved education at all levels, began his term of office in 1959. He cre-
ated a joint house and senate study committee led by John C. West. The committee recommended that South Carolina fund special schools created to work with the State Development Board and to provide training for workers for industries considering locating in the state. Coordination came from an advisory committee supported by the S.C. Department of Education. To help fund the new venture, legislators used existing federal laws [e.g., 1917 (30 42); 1932 Code Section 5283; 1942 Code Section 5 5394; 1952 Code Section 21–691]. The legislation created no new bureaucracies, gender qualifications, or statements about race. In many ways, this marks a major turning point—a turning away from “massive resistance” to segregation. Further, the lengthy Special Types of Schools of Instruction Act allowed, in Article 8, certain school boards to begin establishing junior colleges.15

The Clemson administration was wary of a junior college system. Although no “statements” were issued, Clemson preferred efforts to create “community colleges,” a combination of two-year junior colleges offering the first two years of course work that, while never defined, had come to be thought of as “general education,” with a wide array of technical and vocational courses tailored to the needs of the areas served by the schools. Broadly constituted local advisory boards kept themselves fully aware of their area’s opportunities and needs and recommended the best local technical and vocational choices to a state advisory board. The latter board was to consider possible duplication of curricula and then recommend truly long-term attractive programs to the State Development Board. Recognizing the issue of local pride, the state board might restrict or forbid costly, unnecessary duplication.16

However, as important as the issue of expanded educational opportunity appeared for the future of all the people, most political, social, and religious leaders focused on the efforts to break or protect the state’s legally instituted policy of racial segregation. Ever since 1938 in the Gaines case, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that whether a state provided higher educational opportunity in a racially unified or separated system, the opportunities had to be of precisely the same quality to all races. To James F. Byrnes, that goal became the clarion call and a major point of emphasis during his gubernatorial term.

In fact, the direction of the nation toward an “open society” was clearly marked in July 1946 when President Harry Truman created the President’s Commission on Higher Education. When the commission finished its work in 1948, its report addressed a number of higher education issues. Its major recommendations were two. First, increased research at America’s most capable higher education institutions was critical for the long-term health of the nation. But the focus did not always meet the regional characteristics, and vast duplication of efforts proved wasteful. Because the cost of new scientific and technological research likely exceeded the capacity of any single institution or state, the commission placed the obligation to fund such research on the federal government for the “general welfare” of the nation. That move was in the tradition of the Hatch Act of 1887. And when the
issue was agricultural, the “land-grant delivery system,” which took the regional characteristics of climate and soil into account, was appropriate. Further, the land-grant schools gathered an excellent collection of scientists and technologists. That was not necessarily true in the other fields that the federal government deemed necessary for the “general” (as opposed to “individual”) welfare. Thus, according to the commission report, the federal government, as the “fount of funds,” must select those institutions that were to be the research centers. That approach proved most effective in war efforts such as the famous “Manhattan project.”

The second recommendation of the President’s Commission on Higher Education was, to many, much different. The report stated that access to education (particularly higher education) must be available for all races and religions. Therefore, where federal money went, the Fourteenth Amendment followed. The Supreme Court’s Gaines decision could play an extended but clear role in accomplishing this “open access” concept. Therefore, threatened were not only the states with the de jure racial, but also all the de facto exclusions in the nation based on religion or ethnicity. While no effort was made immediately to require anything like that, it is not hard to recognize the longer influences in Clemson’s and Edward’s disappointment with the rebuffing of the school’s Atomic Energy Commission effort.

Within two years of the presidential commission’s educational report, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a state that practiced de jure segregation must open to African American students programs that were hitherto available only to white students at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Louisiana complied. South Carolina chose to consider some duplication in areas potentially in demand by African Americans. The field that came to mind was law, and the state completed preparations to open a second law school at South Carolina State College.

To that point, the only legal change vis-à-vis racial separation was Truman’s executive order racially desegregating the armed forces. The stunning unanimous 1954 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in a case called Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Kansas) ruled that “separate was inherently unequal.” While that ruling covered only the small group of school districts in the suit, it included one South Carolina district that provided public school bus transportation for whites but not for African Americans. Further, some legal experts argued that the ruling applied only to elementary and high schools because they were the schools in which attendance was mandatory. The court, however, clearly indicated the potential difficulties throughout the country in its phrase, “with all due deliberate speed.”

Even if the ruling applied only to primary and secondary public schools, the higher education state institutions in Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri ended racial restrictions. After a Supreme Court implementation ruling in 1955, Oklahoma and Arkansas ended legal racial segregation in their state post-secondary institutions. The last major case on school segregation in higher education heard by the Supreme Court was Frasier v. North Carolina, when the court
upheld the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that persons should be admitted to public colleges and universities on the basis of ability not race.\textsuperscript{20}

In the Atlantic Coast Conference, only the state of South Carolina’s public colleges remained completely segregated by law. In October 1957, North Carolina State’s football team and band arrived for the scheduled game. The band, which included two African Americans, ate in Clemson’s dining hall. A complaint was filed with South Carolina’s attorney general, but the state took no official action. In the spring, President Poole wrote the North Carolina State president asking him to keep two African American varsity tennis players from traveling to Clemson for the match. NC State ignored the request.\textsuperscript{21}

A more troubling issue for Clemson’s trustees regarding segregation had occurred a year earlier, on July 17, 1956, when John L. Gainey, an African American veteran, inquired about admission to the college’s textile chemistry program. Clemson sent him the usual admissions forms and information, but Gainey proceeded no further.\textsuperscript{22} Later, the University of Georgia faced possible racial integration. Some public officials urged that the school be closed, and some students distributed a public declaration, “We will NOT welcome these intruders. We will NOT associate with them. We will NOT associate with white students who welcome them.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{A Request from Charleston}

On July 19, 1959, Harvey Gantt, a rising senior at Burke High School in Charleston, wrote Clemson, requesting materials for applying to Clemson’s School of Architecture. On July 21, Reginald Berry, the admissions director, promptly sent the materials and offered to answer any questions Gantt might have. But Gantt’s application was not completed. Had it been and had Gantt been admitted, then under South Carolina law, enacted in 1956, which gave the State Budget and Control Board authority to withhold state funds from institutions that were integrated, funds could have been withheld from South Carolina State at the same time.\textsuperscript{24}

Gantt was also interested in Tuskegee Institute, Iowa State College, and Howard University. Gantt remembered that his Burke High guidance counselor encouraged him to go to Iowa State (as opposed to Tuskegee or Howard) because “99 percent of the architects practicing in the United States were white, and he needed to be trained where they are.”\textsuperscript{25} So Gantt selected Iowa State and enrolled at Ames in the autumn of 1960. However, several things bothered him. Most of the other students were from the Midwest. Gantt planned to practice in the Southeast; thus, he would not meet his potential colleagues while in school. He also noted that a ranking of schools of architecture placed Clemson’s program quite a bit above Iowa State’s. The weather provided another concern for
Gantt. As the winter approached, the days grew shorter, the wind blew colder, and mounds of snow accumulated. Gantt remembers that as he trudged through deep snow in below-zero weather, he knew he wanted to return home. Back in his dormitory, he began the transfer process to Clemson. He recounted later that he shortly received his application back, along with a letter from Kenneth Vickery noting that South Carolina law provided that for African Americans who desired fields not available to them in South Carolina, the state would pay the out-of-state differential. Of course, this did not compensate for the lost opportunity or for the other possible limitations that weighed on Gantt’s mind.26

In the meantime, Edwards had notified the trustees that the college had received two transfer applications, one from Gantt and a second from Cornelius Fludd, also an African American Charlestonian. Fludd’s interest was electrical engineering, which South Carolina State did not offer.27 Whatever the attitude the other trustees held, Senator Brown let a number of his state senatorial colleagues know about the applications. Among them was Senator Marion Gressette, chair of the Segregation Committee.28

Senator T. Allen Legare of Charleston also received notice of the applications. He informed Brown that Gantt and Fludd, while home from their colleges on Christmas vacation, had met with local leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). They also conferred with lawyer Matthew Perry, a graduate of the South Carolina State College Law School. They wanted advice about their applications. Legare also noted that both Gantt and Fludd had a “blemish.” Both, when seniors at Burke High School, had been arrested along with twenty-seven other young people for trespassing when they “sat in” at a lunch counter. Found guilty, they paid their fines on April 1, 1960.29

Through Gantt’s exchange of letters with Vickery, the latter set forth the transfer requirements. Gantt submitted an Iowa State transcript that indicated a “B-plus average” and also a statement of Gantt’s eligibility to return to school. There must have been some delay in the report on Gantt’s College Board examination scores because it did not arrive at Clemson until August 1961. Gantt had taken the test during his senior year in high school, some eighteen months earlier. Gantt scored 7.5 percent higher than the average of Clemson’s freshman class of 1961. Gantt also notified Vickery when he would be available in June to complete whatever remained of the transfer process.30

Imagined and Real Impediments

Meanwhile, on July 11, 1961, the presidents of the five state institutions (the Citadel, Clemson, South Carolina State College, the University of South Carolina, and Winthrop) met informally in Columbia. Although they met regularly, this was not a scheduled business meeting; there are no surviving minutes. All that can be
deduced is from subsequent correspondence among the participants. Because other schools had also received “other race” applications, that appears to have been their discussion topic. The consensus seems to have been that whatever else, each leader’s primary duty was to his college or university, to its survival, and its reputation.31

At Clemson, several other issues existed regarding admissions: housing and standards. Because of its military heritage, and because of its small surrounding community (the not-yet-available 1960 census reported a population of 1,154 for the recently incorporated town), Clemson College aimed to be fully residential. The state had made that difficult for women students, but a solution for it was in hand, thanks to Edwards’s diplomacy. For men, unless they lived with parents or nearby relatives, were older, or were married, living on campus was obligatory. Thus, the college needed no new accommodations for an African American male.

Also, academic entrance standards had increased. A long, slow trend in this regard reached back to Hartzog’s administration (1897–1902). Nonetheless, the CMP report stated that admissions standards had to rise even more. Edwards had firmly supported the move because he perceived that improved academic standards meant the long-term economic development of the state and region. The process to increase admission standards, guided by Vickery, the registrar and the admissions director, at the dictate of the Board of Trustees, had the goal of admitting only students who showed a reasonable chance of graduation in the field selected. A great amount of data needed analyzing. Admissions and Registration collected reams of statistical and other information, such as entrance test scores, high school grade average, quality of the high school, applicants’ high school rank, the field students wanted to study, and other measurable factors. Once Vickery developed the process, he gained a regional and then national reputation as a leader in this analytical race. As these data were compared to and correlated with graduation performance, the field became statistically more and more dependable.32

Clemson’s attractiveness to prospective students grew wider. As demand for entering Clemson crept up, space became increasingly critical, whether measured in beds, laboratory tables, architecture drafting tables, or books in the library. Thus, room for entering students depended on sleeping and study space. Even that had its problems. The addition of females, so far as it concerned housing, represented a much greater problem than the addition of an African American male. But the addition of an upper-division architecture student, who required a twenty-four-hour-a-day dedicated drafting table, was much more difficult than a biology student, who shared laboratory space with a dozen other students.

As the summer of 1961 wore on, there remained a cadré of prospective students with incomplete applications. In most cases, the fault lay with the student’s not having submitted something required. In Gantt’s case, he had requested the College Board scores, but they were slow in arriving. Gantt’s incomplete application also involved the required interview and inspection of his earlier drawings.
and designs. He had made a number of efforts to schedule the interview, which proved unsuccessful. Then Gantt, along with other applicants, received the letter saying that all places in the freshman and transfer groups were taken.

So, for Harvey Gantt, the trip was “back to Ames.” At Iowa State, Gantt’s experience (apart from the weather) was good. He had pleasant relationships with the other students; his teachers were attentive. But Gantt knew he would not be designing buildings for that environment; thus, many elements of design such as materials, window placements, heating and air handling, and insulation differed from those used for the South. He exchanged a bit more correspondence with Vickery, and on November 13, 1961, he wrote requesting that his earlier application be considered as a new and current application to Clemson. If that were not possible, he asked Vickery to send a new transfer application form. Clemson mailed the materials on November 22, 1961. By December 6, 1961, Gantt sent in his application and, over the winter and spring, such other materials as Vickery requested.

On June 13, 1962, Gantt, Fludd, and Matthew Perry arrived at Clemson to meet with Vickery; his supervisor, Walter T. Cox Jr., dean of students; and Clemson’s legal advisor, William L. Watkins. Gantt asked that the meeting serve as his architectural interview. Vickery stated that Dean Harlan McClure of the Architecture School had to conduct the architectural interview and that Dean Matthew James Perry (1921– ), a product of the South Carolina State College School of Law, was Gantt’s lead attorney in the eventually successful suit to integrate Clemson in 1963. Perry was named to the U.S. Military Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., in 1976 and was later appointed to the U.S. District Court for the South Carolina District in 1979, the first African American to hold a federal judgeship in the state. Perry (far left) is pictured with Gantt and attorney Constance Baker Motley. Taken from Greenville News, January 28, 1963.
McClure was not available. Only Gantt and Fludd attended the meeting; Perry had remained off campus.33

On June 26, Gantt telegraphed Vickery: “Informed transcript of my grades forwarded to your office June 13 1962. Request my application to Clemson be favorably considered and I be given interview reply within 48 hours please.”

Vickery responded on June 28: “Transcript received. Your application along with all others pending completion is being processed in manner we advised during your visit to this office on June 13. You will be advised date for interview as soon as other details to your application have been completed.” Perry felt keenly that Vickery did not move with speed in all stages of Gantt’s admissions process.34

**Gantt’s Lawsuit**

The exact timing of the events during the next two weeks is unclear. McClure wrote a detailed letter dated July 2 that carefully laid out what would be needed for the interview. Further, he advised Gantt to make his portfolio as complete as possible. But on July 7, Perry, along with Willie T. Smith, an associate, filed suit in behalf of Gantt in the Western District of the South Carolina Division of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Greenville. The suit named as defendants the thirteen Clemson trustees (even though Robert L. Stodddard, a legislative trustee, had resigned when elected mayor of Spartanburg, and W. A. Barnette had died), Vickery, registrar, and J. T. Anderson, the superintendent of the S.C. Department of Education. Gantt’s lawyers included Perry and his law partner, Lincoln C. Jenkins Jr.; lawyers Donald James Sampson and Willie T. Smith Jr. of Greenville; and Jack Greenberg and Constance Baker Motley of New York, New York. Greenberg and Motley belonged to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.35 The summons, complaint, and motion asked for a preliminary injunction requiring the college to admit Harvey Gantt. On the instructions of Clemson’s Development Vice President Frank Jervey, Joe Sherman, director of alumni affairs and public relations, notified the Associated Press and the United Press International news bureaus of the lawsuit.36

By Monday, July 9, 1962, the *Greenville Piedmont* headlined, “Negro Youth Files Suit For Clemson Admission” and reported that the legal action “marked the initial suit brought in South Carolina for admission on a college level to a hitherto-segregated institution.”37 The next day, the *Charlotte Observer* pointed out that “a similar suit was brought in an attempt to integrate the University of South Carolina Law School or require the state to provide a law school for Negro students. The state adopted the latter course, setting up a law school at State College for Negroes in Orangeburg.”38

The Clemson news office also noted that the court papers had been delivered to South Carolina’s Attorney General Daniel McLeod. But Watkins and Ed-
gar Brown had kept McLeod fully informed about the lawsuit and every other controversial issue that had occurred. While South Carolina’s government had forestalled integration by opening a second law school in 1947, the demand for places in law far exceeded that in architecture. To business-minded folk, it would have been difficult, no matter how “great the issue,” to justify such an expense for architecture.

William Watkins, a University of Virginia Law School graduate and an excellent lawyer, had worked with Clemson’s leadership to bring the Hartwell Lake issue to a satisfactory conclusion, including helping the college acquire replacement land. Noted for his gentility, Watkins never failed to treat every witness with respect, every opposing counsel with courtesy, and every judge with good manners. Consequently, he provided a contrast to many in his profession who, on occasion, mounted strident postures that only attracted attention. Perry later described Watkins as “a fine gentleman. He and I had a very fine relationship.”

Watkins built his case on two points. First, South Carolina law did not forbid racial integration of public colleges and universities. Second, Gantt had not completed his application; therefore, it had neither been considered nor denied. The law, however, was fraught with potentially devastating penalties for any white state higher education institution that enrolled an African American and for South Carolina’s only public African American college. Were the S.C. Budget and Control Board to decide so, the two schools could lose all state funding. Including South Carolina State in the severe penalty was a design of the Gressette committee and legislature to discourage African Americans from applying to the currently all-white schools.

Rumors surfaced in South Carolina (and probably elsewhere) that the NAACP had persuaded Gantt to apply to Clemson. The presence of Greenberg and Motley on Gantt’s legal team added weight to the rumor, although nothing improper existed if that had been the case. Perry remembered that he had met Gantt in the spring of Gantt’s senior year at Burke High School. Gantt had been arrested for taking part in a “sit in” at a lunch counter in downtown Charleston. Perry recalled, “Gantt came up to me, and he said, ‘Hello! My name is Harvey Gantt. I’m going to be an architect. I want to go to school at what I understand is one of the finest schools of architecture in the country… Clemson College. But I understand there might be a problem; and they tell me that I might not qualify because of the color of my skin.’” Gantt then asked Perry if he would help him get admitted should Clemson deny his application. From this exchange, one can infer that Gantt sought out Perry because he wanted to study architecture at Clemson; he was not recruited to apply by anyone.

The lawsuit contained eight pages. Watkins responded correctly for Clemson that Gantt had not completed his application. But Perry pointed out that Gantt had attempted “to comply variously with the requirements of the regis-
tration office, which invariably informed [Gantt and Fludd] that your applications are incomplete in that you did not do thus and such..." Each defendant had reviewed the Clemson response written by Watkins while at a conference in McLeod’s office. McLeod, Gressette, and lawyer David Robinson, who counseled the legislature’s segregation committee, also attended. According to Watkins’s draft of Clemson’s response, the school could legally admit Gantt if the completed application warranted it. Further, Watkins wrote that Clemson did not agree that the state’s legislation imposing penalties for admission of an African American was constitutional. Every defendant read it and agreed to it. Gressette initially objected but, after consulting with Robinson, withdrew his position.

What, then, did Clemson hope to achieve? Watkins suggested, “Time.” In Alabama and Georgia, efforts to admit African Americans to public “no Negro” institutions had encountered raucous and even violent reactions. Clemson’s leadership, particularly President Edwards and Walter T. Cox, dean of students, knew the college needed time to prepare for the entrance of the first African American into a hitherto “no Negro” South Carolina public college since Reconstruction. During the football season, a visiting conference team fielded an African American player, who, when he came onto the field, was heckled and booed. Edwards left his seat at the top of the stadium, made his way to the sidelines, and using the cheerleaders’ microphone told the crowd, students and others, to behave in a polite and civil manner. The crowd went silent and obeyed. While Edwards and Cox felt sure student leadership would not be the locus of trouble in the admission of Gantt to Clemson, they could not be certain of other groups.

Clemson submitted its response on July 30, 1962, and Federal Judge C. C. Wyche set the date of August 22 to hear both sides on Gantt’s request for relief and admission to Clemson that autumn term. Charles Wickenberg, the Columbia-based reporter for the Charlotte Observer, wrote that both sides thought it “the strongest integration case” filed in South Carolina since the 1954 Brown v. Topeka ruling.

After hearing both sides, Wyche, on September 6, 1962, stated that no evidence existed that Clemson had either created or used the “portfolio-interview” entrance requirement for architecture simply to bar African Americans. He based this on an examination of all applications for admission to Clemson for 1961–1962. Therefore, he did not find for Gantt in the case. Perry immediately petitioned to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The chief judge designated a three-magistrate panel to hear the appeal: Simon Sobeloff of Baltimore, Maryland (himself the chief justice), retired Judge Morris Soper, also of Baltimore, and Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. of Greenville. The hearing lasted two days, September 25 and October 4, at which time the justices withheld their decision, stating “assurance having been given by counsel for the college that the case can be conveniently heard on the merits in the District Court at an early date” and requiring
that the case be heard no later than the first term date in January so that the final
decision came in time for spring semester.47

Respite for Preparation

Clemson had gained the valuable preparation time Edwards and his advisors
sensed they needed. Edwards dispatched Joe Sherman to visit campuses that had
experienced court-ordered integration, both those that occurred quietly and oth-
ers that were contentious. Sherman was a direct man, not given to unnecessary
words or flourishes. He submitted a straightforward report. In each instance of
violence at schools, blame could be laid at many feet.

He pointed toward five groups. First, state political figures, mainly elected,
usually inserted themselves into the action and overrode the school’s officials. The
goals of the two were not always similar. Second, communication between those
in institutional control (whether the school, civil, or police authorities) and the
plaintiff and her or his party (legal counsel, family, national or local organizations,
friends, etc.) had broken down. Third, the emotions of students, given their ages
and backgrounds, could be volatile. Fourth, the press’s goal seemed more often to
capture photo shots, “creative” video footage, or a special article angle or activity rather
than functioning as good witnesses for a wider public. And fifth, frequently state
and regional “outsiders” initiated incidents.48

Sherman’s five “findings” guided the actions of Clemson’s leaders through-
out the autumn of 1962. Edwards, in a way so characteristic of his leadership
style, had strong and close relationships with many of the state’s leaders. In the
business world, his most influential connections existed through Clemson’s own
Board of Trustees, with men like Jim Self in the textile industry, Charles Daniel
in construction, and Bob Cooper in power. To them could be added Edwards’s
own personal relations with Roger Milliken, whose involvement in agriculture,
industry, and textile and chemical research was worldwide, or John Cauthen, the
acknowledged leader of the state’s textile manufacturers.49 Edwards’s ties to state
government were no less formidable, and again existed in part through the board.
As chair of the state Senate Finance Committee, Edgar Brown—an old new-
dealer and southern progressive, who, like most southern politicians, preferred
integration’s “cup not to have come”—had close ties to the influential “Barnwell
Ring” of South Carolina politicians, which included Solomon Blatt and Win-
chester Smith of Williston. Some charged that this small coterie ran the state
government. Edwards’s economic and educational alliance with Governor “Fritz”
Hollings, who held a strong place among southern moderates, and his successor
apparent, Donald Russell, strengthened the ties. The relationship between Ed-
wards and Russell, while Russell served as president of USC, had been marked by
amity and cooperation.
On the issue of communications, all of Clemson’s leadership had kept such lines wide open. Watkins, although not pleased at dealing with the NAACP legal team, treated Motley and Greenberg with courtesy. With Perry, however, the relationship developed into one of mutual and genuine respect. Watkins and Edwards both admired Perry’s honesty and manners. All three collaborated on plans that helped keep peace and calmness. Communications also meant the college’s leadership maintain openness toward the press. Logically, this role fell to Sherman, who handled it brilliantly. This proved effective as the day of change came closer. Further, Sherman had a close working relationship with Jim Strom, the chief of the State Law Enforcement Division, and Silas Pearman, head of the State Highway Commission. Together, they worked to develop a precise plan for the day of change. Later, the media received the final timetable, thus removing the necessity of its frenetic scouting for stories.

Walter Cox received the dual task of working with students and alumni. Cox was an extraordinary person who rarely forgot anyone or anything. More so, he remembered the nuances of familial relationships stretching back through the years. His unflinching loyalty to Clemson fell second only to his love of his family, and in 1962 his oldest son was an accomplished Clemson junior and member of the Tiger football team. Dean Cox, as almost everyone knew him, and his assistant, George Coakley, visited with as many student groups, clubs, and fraternities as possible. Even when met by angry, hostile, or bitter students, their message touched many. In a meeting with one of the YMCA subdivisions, an out-of-state student with no family ties to Clemson commented to Coakley, “I don’t like this, I think it wrong, but I would never do anything to hurt the honor and integrity of Clemson.”

Several years earlier, in 1959, one of The Tiger columnists had written,

May we hope and pray, too, for amity between the races as we successfully ride out the storm. May demagoguery and agitation from without be damned. May the ominous connotations of the terms “segregation” and “discrimination” be forgotten and the beauty of these words returned.

May the United States of America remain one nation indivisible….Thus was our legacy. Certainly we owe this to posterity.

Those words expressed the thoughts of a patient, moderate young man who saw the race issue from a historical perspective and based on his nation.

Two years later, in September 1961, as the possibility of integration “bypassed” Clemson, another Tiger columnist, Zalin “Zip” Grant, had written, “Can South Carolina, along with Mississippi and Alabama, continue to sashay merrily on its way down a path which is contrary to the Constitution?” Grant continued by setting before his readers two men as examples of racial extremism. One was an African American whose rhetoric advocating violence toward whites led to his
removal from the NAACP; the other, a white calling for nothing short of racial warfare. Grant ended by asking Clemson students to choose as to whether the students preferred one of those paths or integration.\textsuperscript{52} As Clemson opened in September 1962, Grant again wrote an editorial column that set out President Edwards’s recent talk to some 200 student leaders in which Edwards “unfolded step by step the fight to integrate Clemson and declared strongly that he would keep the student body informed about the issue.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Sorrow in Mississippi}

But the eyes of South Carolinians were not fixed on Clemson. Rather, they, black or white, segregationist or integrationist (or somewhere in between), watched the situation unfolding in Mississippi. Just a week before Grant’s editorial in \textit{The Tiger} and in response to a judicial stay on the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, an Alabaman, set aside the stay and ordered that Meredith be admitted. Three days later, on September 13, 1962, Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett read a message on the radio and television to his fellow citizens:

In the absence of constitutional authority and without legislative action, an ambitious federal government, employing naked and arbitrary power, has decided to deny us the right of self-determination in the conduct of the affairs of our sovereign state….The Kennedy Administration is lending the power of the federal government to the ruthless demands of these agitators….The day of expediency is past. We must either submit to the unlawful dictates of the federal government or tell them no.\textsuperscript{54}

Three days passed, and on September 16, 1962, the closest major southern newspaper to Oxford, Mississippi, the \textit{Commercial Appeal} of Memphis, Tennessee, responded:
The issue arouses the emotions of the people of both sides. It has disrupted the processes of education in many localities. We can sympathize with the strong feelings of many Mississippians in this crisis. But we hope that in this confrontation they will let reason and temperance prevail, that they will place law and order above the frustrated anger which can lead to violence....

Shortly thereafter, the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Education ceded to Governor Barnett full power as registrar. By the morning of September 27, the day Meredith expected to enroll at Ole Miss in Oxford, Barnett proposed to Robert Kennedy, President John F. Kennedy’s brother and U.S. attorney general, that if the U.S. marshals accompanying Meredith drew weapons, Barnett would back away, thus allowing the governor to “save face.” Kennedy agreed to the public sham. However, as the day progressed, the crowds milling around the university campus convinced the governor he should negate the agreement. On September 30, South Carolina senior senator and Clemson alumnus Strom Thurmond wired the president, urging him not to use troops, calling the action “unconstitutional, abominable and highly dangerous.”

By 4:30 p.m., U.S. marshals were in place on the university campus, and at 6:30 p.m. Meredith arrived. Some in the large crowd threw rocks, bricks, bottles, and lead pipes, hitting the federal marshals. In less than fifteen minutes, President Kennedy broadcast by television to the nation, “Mr. James Meredith is now in residence on the campus of the University of Mississippi. This has been accomplished thus far without the use of National Guard or other troops....” But at almost the same moment, a foreign journalist was killed. By 10:00 p.m., the violent crowd had wounded two state troopers and a U.S. marshal. Slightly after 2:00 a.m. on October 1, units of the U.S. Army arrived on the Ole Miss campus and restored a semblance of order. No positive evidence places Ole Miss students among the fighters, although hostile behavior against Meredith continued for a good while longer.

**Clemson’s Preparations**

Certainly, the elements of the problems Joe Sherman had identified seemed present at Oxford. But the resolve of Edwards, the actions of Clemson’s board, and all the planning for Clemson’s integration would prove effective. However, before that happened, Edwards and Governor Hollings showed themselves more than equal to the task that faced South Carolina.

Edwards continued what he had already done so well—communicating with the students. He met regularly with student leaders who played a very important role in the Clemson system of communications. In addition, he conferred often with *The Tiger* staff. On October 19, Edwards talked with Dave Gumula, the paper’s chief editor for 1962–1963. The resulting published article made no reference to cases, issues, or violence on any other campuses. Instead, it set out the chronology
of Gantt’s case and quoted Edwards explaining from his perspective why Clemson had taken its actions in the matter. Much of the article dealt with the dates of the arrival of Gantt’s transcript from Iowa State, or Architecture Dean McClure’s request to see Gantt’s portfolio, and how that request and the filing of Gantt’s suit by Matthew Perry, his legal counsel, had crossed each other. Edwards also stated that when Gantt wrote McClure and offered to present his portfolio, on the advice of Watkins, Clemson “took the position, through its attorney, that since the college’s administrative procedures were under attack, it would not be proper to do anything further on this matter until the case had been disposed in the courts.”59 Such regular, open communications helped keep troublesome rumors to a minimum.

But The Tiger also took a risky step in the same issue. The staff interviewed students, asking them, “How do you feel about the admission of Harvey Gantt to Clemson?” Some students refused to answer. The paper printed a selection of responses. They ranged from “Being from the Deep South, I have associated with ‘niggers’ all my life. I cannot say that I hate them but…” to “I see no reason why Harvey Gantt should not be accepted into Clemson if, as an individual, he is qualified for admission.” The staff summarized, “The general feeling seemed to be that students personally did not like the idea but that they, as individuals, would do nothing which would downgrade the high reputation of Clemson College or impede his admission.” The main editorial concluded, “The tragedy that was Mississippi must not become the tragedy that is Clemson. We, as students, don’t want it; the faculty doesn’t want it; and we hope, no sane person that has considered the matter rationally would want it.”60

The attention of Clemson leaders continued to focus on Sherman’s report. His fourth point, concerning the press, fell to him to solve. He surmised that in every case in which problems existed at other schools, the latter kept the press wondering about the time of the arrival of the plaintiff to register. Thus, the press, following local radio and television, chased every rumor up and down the highways and around the campus, eventually producing widespread confusion. Sherman drafted a plan that provided the press with an accurate and specific, minute-by-minute schedule. In this, he worked with college Police Chief Jack Weeden, whose small forces received help from officers of the Highway Patrol. With those logistics cared for, Sherman and Weeden, armed with enlarged road maps and detailed campus maps, went to Columbia to consult with Chief Strom and Director Pearman and with Attorney General McLeod on issues of law and campus access. The approval (or in some correspondence, “understanding”) was necessary if Sherman’s plan were to succeed fully.

With those approvals, or understandings, in hand, Sherman set up a meeting with Edwards, the four principal college officers, and Watkins to consider the plan. The first principle was that on the day slated for Gantt to register, the college would close the campus to all people except students, faculty, staff, and oth-
ers issued written permission by President Edwards. This was presented with the authorization of the attorney general, and the advisors assembled recommended that enforcement for students, faculty, and staff would be through the use of identity cards. Students had used such cards since the autumn of 1954, first for meals, then for borrowing books from the library, and later for campus events. Jim Burns, who served as the campus photographer, set up a studio and began photographing the staff and faculty. The photos were used to create identity cards for everyone from the trustees through the president to the farm workers and to the professors.

The most likely contentious issue was restriction on the press. Sherman’s plan granted limited access to a number of regional media. He organized the national press by corps (AP, Reuters, etc.) and medium (print, broadcast, etc.) and allowed each to dispatch a small team, with special certification, to a restricted campus area. The area included the entrance from the Old Greenville Highway (now Walter T. Cox Boulevard) to Tillman Hall and access to the latter’s first floor, the location of the Office of Admissions and Registration. The rest of the campus, at least for the days immediately before and after the expected arrival of Gantt, was open only to people with college ID cards. In addition, the college, which maintained (and still does) its own police, fire, and power, stockpiled extra supplies for most eventualities. Sherman’s staff notified all groups involved of the decisions and restrictions. Rental space for telephone and Teletype, and for hotel bedrooms, was available by reservation and advanced payment. After a great deal of questioning and other discussion among his advisors, Edwards traveled to Columbia to present the plan to Governor Hollings, the constitutional officers, and the governor’s staff. Then the trustees approved the plan.61

The Day Draws Nigh

During November 19–21, 1962, the Federal Court for South Carolina (Western Division) reheard the case “on its merits.” Judge Wyche presided over all hearings. At Perry’s request, Wyche took special note of “certain statutes and Acts of the State of South Carolina.” Wyche ruled on December 21 that there was no fault or racial bias on the part of Clemson, its trustees, or the registrar.62 Immediately, Gantt’s counsel appealed the decision back to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond.

On the Clemson campus, communications remained open. The Tiger published, with editorial comments and historical analogies, a selection of the mail from the public (including alumni). A letter from a Charleston-based group titled “Concerned Clemson Alumni,” mailed to some individual students, labeled the integration effort part of a Communist ploy to “weaken our country’s resistance.” In the November 9 edition, Zip Grant delighted in taking the letter apart to dis-
pute its logic. On December 14, Frank L. Gentry, the paper’s managing editor, published an editorial that reduced the issue for the students to two questions. First, regardless of what you think about segregation or integration, when integration comes, how will you, the individual, react? Will it be with peace or with violence? Regardless of how you feel about segregation or integration, if you, the student, “believe in constitutional government,” you must choose peace, wrote Gentry. Second, recognizing that each person has the constitutional right to advocate either position, does that presume to give each or any of us the right “that would endanger the lives and principles of others?” An answer leading to physical resistance or verbal abuse could itself only lead to “killing.” And a riot would be to “kill our way of life, kill the school as a university, kill the value of each Clemson diploma, and kill the growth and progressive spirit of this state, and above all, it would kill our self-respect.”

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals met on January 9, 1963, to hear Gantt’s case. In its ruling issued on January 16, the three justices (Sobeloff, Soper, and Haynsworth) dismissed the position that South Carolina did not prohibit the integration of the races but merely discouraged it with a caustic remark that the argument was “a novel one in legal literature, and we must hold it unacceptable.” With this statement, the court destroyed the foundation of the state Segregation Committee’s legal maneuvering. Further, the court turned its eye on Clemson’s negative response to Gantt’s post-suit request for a review of his portfolio. It ruled that here the fault was procedural, in that the college should have accepted the portfolio and examined it in the same way that it had all others since the school had instituted such a review in 1961. The court held that “officials of a college ought to be allowed to pass upon applications free of the coercive effect of a pending action against them....” And in conclusion, the court ordered “Gantt’s admission to Clemson College, beginning with the opening of the next semester.”

Edwards had a statement ready for the media, prepared and taped for release the next day. He stated that Clemson would appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The speed with which the statement was ready suggests the college, its attorney, and the state government had already concluded that such a ruling was imminent, but that Clemson and the state government must, for political reasons, follow the path through to its conclusion. However, the message contained a deep and sincere request. The Clemson students were taking final semester examinations, and faculty were immersed in making judgments that affected the 4,000 students. After all, this was “Clemson’s first mission—that of education.” Clemson’s officers wanted no disruption or disturbance.

The appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court would have delayed enforcement of the court order, but would not overturn it. When presented to Chief Justice Earl Warren by his clerk, Warren wrote, “Denied. E.W.” While at least one scholar concluded, “Clemson had lost,” that view referred to the suit brought against
Clemson, its trustees, Vickery, and the state superintendent of education.\textsuperscript{66} What that did not take into account, however, was that just as Thomas G. Clemson’s will had not mentioned gender, it also did not specify race; the justices of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in fact rejected the argument that a difference in substance existed between the state’s concept of “deny” and “discourage.”

Regarding the court’s decision, Governor Hollings addressed the legislature in his last speech to it as governor. That day, he reminded the legislators that South Carolina had a tradition of respect for the law, and he told them and their constituents, “We are running out of courts, we are running out of appeals and time.” The speech, coupled with public statements from state Senator Edgar Brown, from South Carolina’s revered statesman James Byrnes, and from Marion Gressette defused almost all lingering potential for violence. To add to the weight of opinion, the bishops, chairmen, moderators, and secretaries of eight of the larger religious denominations issued a joint statement calling for all to follow the “love of God and neighbor to avoid every form of violence and hatred in our relations among ourselves and to use peaceable means to reach conclusions founded on justice and order.…”\textsuperscript{67}

As the day for Gantt’s arrival on campus to register drew nearer, local physicians offered their services to President Edwards. Given the small population of the little town of Clemson, several addressed him in their correspondence as “Dear Bob.” Edwards’s response, also on a first-name basis, thanked each for the offer but closed, “At the present time I do not believe there will be any need for such steps.”\textsuperscript{68}

The day Gantt was scheduled to enroll at Clemson College now arrived.

\textit{Integration with Dignity}

The Clemson College campus awoke early on the morning of January 28, 1963. Campus police and deputized officers, all in distinctive garbs, patrolled the perimeter of the campus as they had since noon the day before. And each Clemson student received a letter early that morning from Dean Cox in which he stated, “The faculty and administration of Clemson College have confidence in the intelligence and integrity of our students and expect them to exercise good judgment.” Cox reminded the students “to carry their identification cards at all times. Student government officers, student hall supervisors and members of the college faculty and staff have the authority to ask you to exhibit it.” The letter addressed the possibility of disorder and instructed the students that should trouble begin, for all to stay inside, or if outside, to return immediately to the student’s residence hall. He further cautioned them not to “let idle curiosity allow you to become involved in a situation in which you have no connection or responsibility.”\textsuperscript{69}

Slightly under three hours’ driving time away from Clemson, Matthew Perry met in Columbia, first with the attorney general for McLeod’s briefing, and then
Harvey Bernard Gantt (1943– ), shown here exiting the Registrar’s Office on the day Clemson integrated, became Clemson’s first African American student on January 28, 1963. He went on to receive a master’s degree in city planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Charleston native is a partner in the architectural and city planning firm Gantt/Huberman Architects and served two terms as the first African American mayor of Charlotte, N.C. Clemson University Photographs, CUL.SC.

Harvey Gantt meeting with his coordinating dean, Harlan Ewart McClure, FAIA (1916–2001) of the School of Architecture. McClure was head of the Department of Architecture from 1955 to 1957 and became the first dean of the newly created School of Architecture in 1958. A proponent of international architecture and its introduction into South Carolina, he helped create Clemson’s Charles E. Daniel Center for Building Research and Urban Study in Genoa, Italy, in 1972 and helped the school’s architecture program climb to national prominence. McClure retired as dean emeritus of the College of Architecture in 1985. Clemson University Photographs, CUL.SC.
with SLED Chief Strom for his advice. With Perry were Harvey Gantt, his father, Christopher Gantt, and their minister. They then went to the Governor’s Office. There Perry received the Clemson plan for the day. He noted the careful details, including a single car escort one-half mile ahead, a single car rear guard one-half mile behind, and a SLED helicopter monitoring from the air. As the four drove westward toward Clemson, they could see their escort-guardians, and along the roads, units of county law officers watched. Every overpass across the highway had an armed small detachment of state officials. Just this side of Greenville, an old friend of Perry’s caused Perry to stop his car. The man wanted to wish Gantt well on his history-making ride. Before almost any words were exchanged, air surveillance notified the rear guard, which raced forward, and the lead, which swung sideways to block the highway. With external speaker blaring, the rear car quickly arrived within hearing distance and kept repeating, “Mr. Perry, Mr. Perry! Keep moving, keep moving!” Perry pulled away, reached Greenville, and dropped Gantt’s father and the cleric at the arranged spot. Perry and Gantt then were off again. But it suddenly dawned on Gantt that his suitcase was in the car trunk. His checkbook, needed to pay his tuition, was in the suitcase, and he and Perry and suitcase would part company once they reached Clemson. They made another stop to retrieve the checkbook, and again the police urged them to “Keep moving.” The towns rolled by—Easley, Liberty, Norris, and Central—as they moved closer to the campus. Along the road, the crowd thickened, and reporters seemed to be everywhere. Then they entered the long tree-lined way past President Edwards’s home, past the Library (Sikes), and up to the statue of Thomas Green Clemson. Perry stopped the car, Gantt got out, a police guide slipped into Gantt’s seat, and Perry drove on to Gantt’s dormitory. A student took the belongings and moved toward the dormitory. Perry and the guide drove off campus to await the notice that all was well.70

With several college policemen walking beside him, Gantt entered Tillman Hall (the irony was not overlooked) and went to the Registrar’s Office, where he completed the necessary forms and wrote a check for his tuition, room, and board. Then, he and his guides walked out of the old brick building and across campus to the stylistically cool, clean architecture complex. Dean Harlan McClure greeted Gantt, and they sat to evaluate his transcript from Iowa State. Usually, a transfer student’s advisor undertook this task, but Edwards, Academic Vice President Jack Kenny Williams, and McClure wanted no mistakes. When the evaluation process was complete, Gantt and his escort crossed campus to his room in Johnstone Hall, where he would room alone, with a police agent in the room next to him.71

Did the day, the semester, or the other sessions pass without incident? Of course not. Walter Cox told of a student who was marching to and fro on the quadrangle of Gantt’s dormitory, carrying a large Confederate battle flag. Cox asked him to his office and reasoned with him. The student retorted that he was within his First Amendment rights. Cox agreed but reminded him of Clemson’s honor, which he
must protect. The student relented, put away the banner, and went to his dormitory. During the winter months, a mimeographed circular called “Rebel Underground” appeared on campus. An almost identical tract had appeared at Ole Miss.

Another reported incident was in the college dining hall, which could serve 2,300 at one sitting. Early in Gantt’s first semester, he went to meals accompanied by his guard. The first few visits were greeted with silence. However, once, when without the escort, Gantt was waiting in the cafeteria line to be served, two students seated at a table close to the line began making mean and insulting comments in “stage whispers.” After a few moments, Gantt asked the student behind him to hold his place in line. The student agreed; Gantt walked over to the commentators’ table. With a pleasant countenance on his face, Gantt told the two that they had better say nice things about him because if they didn’t, when he got his meal, he would return, sit down, and eat his lunch with them. Perry, upon hearing of this later, said, “Just like Gantt!”

And the press? To the greatest extent they also obeyed Clemson’s plans. On one occasion, however, men with press equipment and credentials approached several students and asked them to participate in interviews at Dan’s Café, the most popular off-campus student “hangout.” The men attempted to set up “informal man on the street” interviews, something Dean Cox had urged the students not to do and something Sherman had also asked the press to avoid. One student’s reaction was a simple, “No!” A second retorted, “Ask a federal marshal!” There were none; the federal offer of such help had been rejected by the governor. A third lectured the newsmen on honor and integrity. One of Clemson’s student leaders, aided by a resident hall supervisor, removed a news reporter/photographer from Gantt’s dormitory ledge and turned him over to the police, who revoked his credentials and expelled him from campus.

Slowly, Gantt ceased being an issue. Architecture consumed him, just as calculus, Shakespeare, and thermodynamics diverted others. Finally, the semester ended. Of course, the national press was amazed! Early on The New York Times printed an editorial (January 31, 1963) that began by pointing out that Gantt was not wanted at Clemson and that the school’s lawyers were petitioning the Supreme Court for relief. Nonetheless, Clemson and its sponsors and the authorities of South Carolina faced up to the issue honorably….On the decisive day the student body itself behaved admirably. Resentment and reluctance there may have been; but there was none of the violence, none of the open flaunting of racial hatred, none of the rowdyism wearing the mask of white supremacy that have characterized events of this land elsewhere. Instead, there was an encouraging display of order and restraint.…What a contrast to Mississippi.

And the editorial was titled “Bravo, Clemson.”
Everyone asked, “Who was the hero in this? Who made it happen?” And everyone had or has her or his own answer. In the courts, the heroes were clearly William Watkins, with his abundant courtesy, and Matthew Perry, with his towering intelligence. In South Carolina, credit goes to the Clemson trustees, the business and manufacturing executives, governors Hollings and Russell, and the attorney general and those in his command. On Clemson’s campus, peaceful integration would not have occurred without the efforts of President Edwards, Dean Cox, the hundreds of faculty and staff who encouraged restraint and courtesy, and without fail, The Tiger staff: Dave Gumula, Zip Grant, Frank Gentry, and Cecil Huey, whose editorials spoke of honesty, true courage, and integrity, virtues frequently in short supply in emergencies. And there’s the subject—Harvey Gantt, a young man who early exhibited a quiet righteousness, who through a three-year travail showed remarkable patience and good humor. And who was the victor? All of the above, but equal to them all, Clemson College. More than any other, that year set Clemson apart.

What was next for both Gantt and Clemson? In the autumn of 1963, Clemson enrolled a new student in mathematics, a young lady named Lucinda Brawley, the first African American female. She and Harvey began to see each other—at the football and basketball games of 1963 and 1964 and the school dances—and they fell in love. At the end of spring 1965, in Clemson’s Outdoor Theater, Gantt strode across the stage and clasped President Edwards’s hand, as a grinning Edwards welcomed Gantt into the “Clemson family.” Brawley and Gantt married, and Gantt enrolled at MIT for the master’s in city planning degree.
As beneficial as the year opened for South Carolina, the comity that could have developed was still slow in coming. Two days after Gantt came to Clemson, the S.C. House Education Committee introduced a state tuition grants bill that would provide indirect support to private schools. *The Tiger* editorial cartoonist depicted it as blatant robbery of an already impoverished program (HR 1155). One of *The Tiger* staff, Jerry Gainey, a junior from Hartsville who was active in the Baptist Student Union and served as assistant chaplain in the YMCA, was also an active member of the S.C. Student Council on Human Relations. With other Clemson students, including Stephen Ackerman from St. George and Emmitt Bufkin from Port Royal,75 Gainey circulated a petition among Clemson students opposing the tuition grants bill. When he presented the petition with 180 signatures to the House Education Committee, a committee member asked if he supported integration. Gainey answered, “Yes, I do believe in integration.”76 In addition, the state conference of the American Association of University Professors and the Spartanburg PTA opposed the idea as injurious to the general public; nonetheless, the house passed the amended bill 78–24 on to the state senate on May 14, 1963. The bill also passed the senate fifteen days later, with house reconciliation on June 5, 1963. After final approval, the state Board of Education issued guidelines for this new program. In Clemson’s case, the state of South Carolina on May 15, 1963, filed a petition to overturn the “class-action status” of the Gantt case. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition on October 14, 1963. In the meantime, other South Carolina racial segregation statutes, ordinances, and regulations continued to fall, although public vestiges would remain into the 1970s.77

As Attorney General McLeod had promised, regardless of the outcome, the state of South Carolina reimbursed the expenses that Clemson incurred in the admission of Gantt. The three greatest expenses were (in order of magnitude descending) the S.C. Highway Patrol, the law firm of Watkins, Vandiver, Freeman and Kirvin, and the State Law Enforcement Division. And the bill totaled $32,697.21. Some (not many) public officials complained, and newspapers carried a few complaints. But the state paid the bill. *The Saturday Evening Post*, in an article entitled “Integration with Dignity,” written by editor George McMillan, hailed the entire process a “conspiracy for peace.”78

**A New Status and a New Name**

There was more on Clemson’s agenda—Clemson’s name, “The Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina.” Although the public name derived from the Clemson will and the state in the Act of Acceptance, customary and institutional use had shifted the style of the name frequently. The Main Building carried the words “Clemson College”—the period indicating that the style was an abbreviation. On occasion, the name used was “Clemson College, the Agricultural and
Mechanical College” or “Clemson A + M.” From the moment Edwards became permanent president, he undertook a campaign to change Clemson’s name. Immediately, and with trustee consent, he had the school use the name most appropriate to the college’s status—“Clemson College.” Stationery, publications, the school ring, all the marks carried that name. But in the minds of most people in the “higher education business” in the United States, the title “college” indicated institutions that granted only bachelor’s degrees or bachelor’s and master’s degrees. The title “university” belonged to institutions in which faculty carried on original research and directed “research doctoral students,” whose accomplishments were rewarded with the doctorate of philosophy. Nowhere was such an idea codified. There were exceptions in the United States; the British usage was more restrictive, while Europe also remained different. In fact, as early as March 17, 1956 (before Edwards had come on the campus), the S.C. Fiscal Survey Commission criticized Clemson for policies that “at least give the impression of a trend to a second university.” After Edwards took over as acting president, the Board of Trustees Development Committee asked the registrar to determine the original and current legal names of all 1862 “stand-alone” land-grant institutions. “Stand alone” was a colloquial term for institutions not attached to existing state liberal arts colleges or to institutions that, when created, were to function as the sole state institution combining both the liberal arts and land-grant colleges.

The move toward doctoral degrees awarded by Clemson began early in the 1950s, and the logical place for it was in the School of Agriculture. Its faculty had the highest number and percentage of PhD degrees, and its faculty had engaged in research since shortly after the college began and before the students had even arrived. It had accredited faculty, the reputation, and, ever since the opening of the three-building Poole Agricultural Center, the facilities to conduct a doctoral program. Consequently, George H. Aull proposed that the Graduate Council recommend that Clemson offer a PhD degree in agricultural economics. The proposal was approved on March 4, 1958. Several other agriculture departments followed suit and admitted doctoral students in the summer of 1958. In two years, in August 1960, the first doctoral candidate, D. H. Petersen, was awarded Clemson’s first such degree.

Edwards was not ready to approach the name change, which he judged might cause a serious uproar. Further, his biggest concern was getting the legislature’s permission to issue dormitory bonds to build a residence hall for women. He also was keeping a watchful eye on Harvey Gantt’s and Cornelius Fludd’s applications for admission. Only when those issues concluded successfully did he feel the time to propose university status was right. He turned again to attorney Watkins for advice. After considerable research, Watkins brought an in-depth report. First, the immediate prerogative to change the name belonged to the state, through action of the legislature and approval of the governor. But second, the
will of Thomas Green Clemson specified the name as “The Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina.” It might be possible that the heirs of Thomas Green Clemson could file suit against the college, the state, or both and gain possession of the property and the Clemson portion of the endowment.

So it became necessary to trace Mr. Clemson’s descendants and secure their permission for the change. Holmes’s and Sherrill’s study of Clemson, although only twenty years old, ended their analysis with Mr. Clemson’s granddaughter, Floride Isabella Lee, married to her second cousin, Andrew Pickens Calhoun II. Efforts to locate her descendants led to Texas and a large collection of Calhouns. Williams, the graduate dean, suggested asking “Whitey” Lander of the History Department, an expert on southern history and on the Calhouns, for help. Edwards did, and in less than twenty-four hours, using gravestones in Woodland Cemetery and records in the college archives, Lander concluded that the only heir was an army captain currently studying for a master’s degree in bacteriology at the University of Wisconsin.

Watkins wrote Capt. Creighton Lee Calhoun on December 4, 1963, explaining the issue in careful detail. Calhoun replied on January 4, 1964:

I am in complete accord with the proposed name ‘Clemson University’ since Clemson College is, today, a university in everything but name. Certainly it would be a travesty for someone considering graduate study to turn away from Clemson College because of a misunderstanding caused by its name. It is significant that the name ‘Clemson’ would be retained in recognition of Thomas Clemson’s foresight and generosity in those dark days following the Civil War.

Calhoun then traced his descent from Mr. Clemson, concluding that his (Calhoun’s) only child, Andrew Duff Calhoun, had been adopted in 1960. He ended, “I am acquainted with the physical and scholastic growth of Clemson College only in a general way, but I am well aware of the great expansion of both in recent years. I hope in the years to come circumstances will allow me to be closer to the institution which was founded by my honored ancestors.”

Armed with the powerful letter, Watkins and Edwards filed suit for declaratory judgment in the S.C. Court of Common Pleas on February 3, 1964. The four-page complaint was accompanied by a document that was developed by Watkins from material provided by J. K. Williams, dean of the college, addressing the differences between universities and colleges in the United States. It noted the changes in Clemson’s size and complexity and the liberty of the trustees to make changes in order to continue the institution’s usefulness to the people of South Carolina. Further, it would bring Clemson’s name into harmony with what was already in effect being done on the campus. The complaint also noted that it would bring Clemson into “line with all other land-grant institutions which have changed their names to reflect enlarged services in their states.” Calhoun, in his
letter, joined the request, permitting the legislature to change the name and not incur objections from Mr. Clemson’s only heir. As required, the attorney general’s response indicated that his office wished to hear or see the evidence.82

Judge James B. Pruitt studied the documents presented by Clemson and the statutes, decisions, and case law that pertained to legal matters dealing with “trusts founded on valuable consideration” and “trusts founded on donation or will.” The judge’s decree concurred with the complainant, and he commented, “The Will of Thomas G. Clemson is a most interesting document. Few papers can be found which have affected the history of this section of the United States more drastically for good.” Further, Judge Pruitt recognized that the administrative side (i.e., the state), for carrying out the true purpose of the trust (the dispositive side), “should give way.” And obviously Mr. Clemson’s will gave to the trustees “full authority ‘to fix the course of studies…and to change them as in their judgment, experience may prove necessary.’” Because the beneficiaries were South Carolina and “the thousands who would benefit from instruction received at the institution if the new name eliminated that of its founder, Mr. Clemson,” Judge Pruitt, on February 28, 1964, decreed that a “change of the name of the plaintiff to ‘Clemson University’ will not constitute a breach of any of the provisions of the Will of Thomas G. Clemson or the trusts imposed thereby.…”83
The appropriate legislation had already made its way through both houses of the general assembly. From the senate, its president, Lieutenant Governor Robert McNair, who, although a graduate of the University of South Carolina, had spent his first semester at Clemson, signed it. Solomon Blatt, speaker of the house and a trustee of the University of South Carolina, signed the bill from the house. Governor Russell, formerly the president of the University of South Carolina, invited a party of Clemson faithful to join him for the final signing held on March 11 in the Secretary of State’s Office. Besides Edwards and Watkins, a number of trustees (including Board of Trustees President Robert Cooper and James Byrnes, former governor and Clemson life trustee), students (including the student body president and the editors of The Tiger and Taps), the president of the Faculty Senate, the president of the Alumni Association, the foundation president, and the four major administrators watched as Russell signed Law No. 803 of 1964. The deed was done.84

However, the actual effective date implementing the name change would be July 1, 1964. Clemson had requested such timing in order to cast the new seal and dies for printing stationery and other communications to all the associations that accredited Clemson, to associations to which Clemson belonged, to the various learned and honorary societies that had chapters on Clemson’s campus, to the counties, and to the other higher education institutions with which Clemson had regular contacts. Also, leading alumni in many walks of life would receive early notification.85

But the state’s newspapers already broadcast the news. The Greenville Piedmont’s editorial of February 3, 1964, carried the headline, “Clemson is a University and Should Be Called It.” On the same day the Columbia Record wrote, “Changing the name of Clemson College to designate the institution as a university will be a long overdue recognition of an accomplished fact.” A week later Charleston’s News and Courier agreed.86

Some young graduates in the June 1964 class felt a bit sorry that their diplomas and rings did not carry the new name, and they made reasonable arguments for that. Some alumni wrote asking (and indicating a willingness to pay) for replacement diplomas and rings. The answer, very gently couched, was that to do such would be misleading to the future and, at worst, dishonest.87

Notes

1. CUL.SC.CUA. S 30 ss 2 b 3 f 15; Orlans, The Non-Profit Research Institute, 13–14; and Mohr and Gordon, Tulane, 112–113.
2. CUL.SC.MSS 91 b 1 f 19.
4. Ibid. Both quotations are from papers within this citation.
5. CUL.SC.MSS 91 b 1 f 19; and b 16 f 213.
6. CUL.SC.CUA. S 30 ss ii b 4 f 1; and CUL.SC.MSS 91 b 16 f 213.
7. CUL.SC.MSS 91 b 16 f 213. The quotation is taken from the letter in this collection.
8. Ibid., 90 S 8 b 8 f 7.
10. Ibid., 90 S 8 b 8 f 7.
20. Ibid., 17–32.
24. CUL.SC.CUA. S 10 f 99.
26. Ibid. See also Ira Berlin, *The Making of African America*.
27. CUL.SC.MSS 90 S 8 b 8 f 9.
28. Ibid., 91 b 16 f 213.
29. Ibid., b 30 f 383.
30. CUL.SC.CUA. S 61 b 128 f 1212.
31. Ibid., S 11 f 673.
32. Ibid., S 30 ss ii b 4 f 5.
34. Suggs in Eisiminger, *Integration with Dignity*, 28; telegram reproduction in Eisiminger, 67. The Perry conclusion was told to Allsep and Reel (see note 33).
35. Watkins, *Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina et al., petitioners, vs. Harvey B. Gantt, a minor, by his father and next friend Christopher Gantt, respondent*.
37. Ibid.
41. Perry to Allsep and Reel.
42. Ibid.
43. Watkins, “Harvey Gantt,” 12. During the Reconstruction government in South Carolina, the public college open during that period had been integrated in both race and gender.
44. Eugene M. Klein, at that time a Clemson freshman, to Reel, Klein’s wife, Violet (a Clemson alumna), and Edmee Reel, September 5, 2008. Several people remembered that it happened in the 1963 season.
48. CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 189.
50. The alumnus, W. P. Sullivan, who related this very personal comment, agreed to being quoted; however, he noted that like Paul, he has come to see this issue “face to face.”


52. Ibid., September 15, 1961.

53. Ibid., September 21, 1962.


55. Ibid.

56. CUL.SC.MSS 100, Subject Correspondence Series 1954–1976, b 3 f 3.


58. Ibid.


60. Ibid.

61. Manning N. Lomax to J. V. Reel; Walter Cox to J. V. Reel; and James Burns to J. V. Reel.


64. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, No. 8871 in CUL.SC.MSS Watkins Papers.

65. CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 19A.

66. Burton, “Dining with Harvey Gantt: Myth and Realities of ‘Integration with Dignity,’” in Burke and Gergel, *Matthew J. Perry: The Man, His Times, and his Legacy*, 184–219 and specifically 192. The comment in the text is mine. Burton's article is based on excellent research and is very well written.

67. The famous Hollings quote was, in this instance, taken from Suggs in Eisminger, *Integration with Dignity*, 36–37. The ministerial reference is in CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 194. See also CUL.SC.MSS 91 f L397.

68. CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 194. The exchanges took place between January 23 and 26, 1963.

69. Ibid.

70. Perry to Allsep and Reel.

71. Gantt to Reel.

72. CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 194; and Perry to Allsep and Reel.

73. Webster P. Sullivan to Reel; and Frank Gentry to Reel.


75. *Taps*, 1963, 130, 244, 247, 302, and 499.

76. Wisconsin Historical Society, MSS 540 f 2.


79. Charlotte *Observer*, March 15, 1956; and CUL.SC.CUA. S 30 ss 4 f 3.

80. CUL.SC.MSS 255 f 1.

81. CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 673.

82. The letter from C. L. Calhoun is in the Watkins papers as are the documents with Clemson’s statement “Basic Reasons for Changing the Name of Clemson College to Clemson University” and an “Extract from the Minutes of October 4, 1963, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina,” along with a letter of March 20, 1963, from J. K. Williams, dean of the college, March 20, 1963.

83. Ibid., County of Oconee, State of South Carolina: Court of Common Pleas, Judgment Roll No. 11,077.


85. CUL.SC.CUA. S 30 v 9, 23.


87. CUL.SC.CUA. S 11 f 82.